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Background. With the increased occurrence of outbreaks of H5N1 worldwide there is concern that the virus could enter
commercial poultry farms with severe economic consequences. Methodology/Principal Findings. We analyse data from four
recent outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in commercial poultry to estimate the farm-to-farm reproductive
number for HPAI. The reproductive number is a key measure of the transmissibility of HPAI at the farm level because it can be
used to evaluate the effectiveness of the control measures. In these outbreaks the mean farm-to-farm reproductive number
prior to controls ranged from 1.1 to 2.4, with the maximum farm-based reproductive number in the range 2.2 to 3.2. Enhanced
bio-security, movement restrictions and prompt isolation of the infected farms in all four outbreaks substantially reduced the
reproductive number, but it remained close to the threshold value 1 necessary to ensure the disease will be eradicated.
Conclusions/Significance. Our results show that depending on the particular situation in which an outbreak of avian
influenza occurs, current controls might not be enough to eradicate the disease, and therefore a close monitoring of the
outbreak is required. The method we used for estimating the reproductive number is straightforward to implement and can be
used in real-time. It therefore can be a useful tool to inform policy decisions.
Citation: Garske T, Clarke P, Ghani AC (2007) The Transmissibility of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Commercial Poultry in Industrialised
Countries. PLoS ONE 2(4): e349. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000349
INTRODUCTION
A new highly pathogenic strain of avian influenza, H5N1,
emerged in the poultry markets of Hong Kong in 1997 and
subsequently re-emerged in Vietnam in 2003. From this time
onwards it has rapidly spread across the globe and is likely to be
endemic in poultry in many parts of the world. Although onward
transmission to humans at present remains limited, the high case
fatality rate in those people that are infected has raised concerns
about the impact of a potential human pandemic [1,2]. Whilst
much research and planning is currently underway to contain any
outbreak in humans, relatively little is known about the extent of
infection in poultry and, in particular, the transmissibility of highly
pathogenic avian influenzas between poultry farms. Such un-
derstanding is vital if we are to limit the potential for a human
pandemic by reducing the extent of infection in poultry, either
through movement restrictions, culling or vaccination.
Avian influenza occurs naturally in wild water fowl, usually in
a low-pathogenic version (LPAI) causing no symptoms or only mild
disease. However, in poultry some strains also occur in a highly-
pathogenic form (HPAI) and result in a devastating disease which
can kill up to 100% of infected birds within 48 hours, and is highly
transmissible between individual birds [3,4]. Transmission between
flocks kept at different farms is thought to occur via movement of
infected birds, equipment or staff, with current evidence suggesting
that air-borne transmission over long distances is rare [5]. There
has been an increase in HPAI outbreaks over the past ten years [4].
In addition to their implications for human health, these outbreaks
also have severe economic consequences for the affected countries.
Typical control measures for HPAI in poultry comprise of swift
isolation and culling of flocks on infected farms, the restriction of
movements between farms, increased bio-security, and the culling
of flocks in the vicinity of infected farms to deplete the susceptible
poultry population. Vaccination, if coupled with a strict surveil-
lance programme, has also been demonstrated to be effective in
reducing the risk of further outbreaks [5,6].
The reproductive number for infected poultry farms, defined as
the average number of farms that each original infected farm
infects at the start of an outbreak (i.e., when most farms are
susceptible), is an important measure of the overall transmissibility
of the virus in a population. It determines whether a self-sustaining
epidemic will occur and, more importantly, yields a tool to assess
the effectiveness of control measures. If, on average, at any point in
time, each infected farm infects more than one further farm, the
epidemic will continue. However, if on average, each infected farm
infects less than one further farm, the epidemic will decline and the
intervention measures applied at that point can be interpreted as
being sufficient to control the outbreak.
In this paper, we analyse published data from four outbreaks of
HPAI in commercial poultry in industrialised countries to estimate
the farm-to-farm reproductive number of HPAI to explore the
extent to which different intervention measures implemented
during these outbreaks reduce the reproductive number. The
results from our analyses can be used to inform current planning
for an outbreak of HPAI in similar commercial poultry sectors.
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METHODS
2.1. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza outbreaks
We analyse data from three different outbreaks of HPAI that
occurred in the past 8 years in industrialised countries: an
outbreak of H7N1 in Italy in 1999/2000, an outbreak of H7N7
in the Netherlands in 2003, that will be treated as two distinct
outbreaks due to geographic separation, and an outbreak of H7N3
in Canada in 2004. Figure 1 shows the time course of these
outbreaks. Brief details of these outbreaks are given below.
2.1.1. Outbreak of H7N1 in Italy in 1999/2000 Northern
Italy has experienced a number of avian influenza outbreaks from
1997 onwards [6–10]. These all occurred in an extremely dense
poultry production area (up to 70 000 birds/km2) and involved
a significant number of farms keeping turkeys, a species known
from experimental studies to be highly susceptible to avian
influenza [11]. Furthermore, in this region there are many
wetlands and resting sites for migratory waterfowl in close
proximity to the poultry industry, which likely lead to multiple
introductions from the wild bird host.
In March 1999, H7N1 LPAI was detected in a farm keeping
turkeys [6,7,9]. This outbreak was not controlled rigorously and so
AI continued to circulate. In December, a case of H7N1 HPAI
was found and strict control measures were implemented,
including culling of affected flocks, movement restrictions and
pre-emptive slaughter of flocks deemed at high risk. However, due
to LPAI circulating at the time, the confirmation of HPAI was
delayed, and so the disease had already infected a number of farms
by the time control measures were enforced. This resulted in an
HPAI epidemic affecting a total of 413 flocks. The LPAI/HPAI
epidemic lasted until April 2000, and involved a total of over 13
million birds.
2.1.2. Outbreak of H7N7 in the Netherlands in 2003 The
H7N7 epidemic in the Netherlands in 2003 affected a total of 255
commercial flocks in two distinct geographical and temporal
clusters. The outbreak was situated in the Gelderse Vallei, the
densest poultry production area in the Netherlands, in which over
10 million birds are kept in 984 flocks with a density of 4 flocks/
km2 [12,13]. Two months into the outbreak the infection passed to
Limburg, another very dense poultry production area, where it
continued to spread.
In the Gelderse Vallei, HPAI was confirmed on 28th February,
6 days after clinical signs appeared in the first infected farm, and
between March and early April, a total of 212 farms were infected.
In Limburg, a further 43 farms were infected between April and
early May.
A number of control policies were enforced in several stages.
From 1st March all movement of poultry and poultry products was
banned, the tracing of dangerous contacts was initiated and
reinforcement of strict bio-security measures was implemented.
Two days later, from 3rd March, culling of infected farms was
initiated. On 5th March the additional pre-emptive culling of farms
within a 1 km radius of any infected farms was put in place. This
was further extended to a 10 km radius for turkey flocks and 3 km
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Figure 1. Time course of the four distinct HPAI epidemics considered. Number of infected farms detected daily for the four distinct epidemics. The
data is given in Table S1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000349.g001
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radius for all other flocks on 7th April [14]. However, these control
measures were insufficient and it is hypothesized that the
epidemics in both areas finally came to a halt due to depletion
of susceptible flocks, after the culling of 30 million birds in 1,255
commercial and 17,421 hobby flocks [15].
During this epidemic, 89 human infections were also reported,
most of whom presented with conjunctivitis or mild influenza-like
illness. One person died from their infection. There was also
evidence of limited human-to-human transmission [16,17].
2.1.3. Outbreak of HPAI H7N3 in British Columbia,
Canada in 2004 The H7N3 outbreak in the Fraser Valley, British
Columbia in Canada [18] started in February 2004 and lasted until
mid-May. During the course of this outbreak, 42 commercial farms
and 11 backyard flocks became infected, and a total of around 17
million commercial poultry were slaughtered which represented
approximately 90% of the poultry population in the area.
Following detection of the index case, a broiler breeder farm,
a surveillance program was initiated, which led to the detection of
the second case on 11th March. The Fraser Valley south of the
River Fraser was declared a Control Area, restricting movements
of birds, bird products and equipment. Furthermore, active
surveillance was undertaken in a High Risk Region (HRR, 5 km
around the index case) and in flocks deemed dangerous contacts in
a Surveillance Region (SR, 10km around index case).
After the identification of 7 infected farms, all birds within the
HRR were slaughtered from 24th March onwards, but as this failed
to stop transmission, on 5th April it was decided to depopulate the
whole Control Area, containing approximately 19 million birds.
Infected farms were located mainly in three distinct local clusters
within the Control Area. It is hypothesized that long distance spread
between these clusters was due to bird, equipment or people
movement, whereas once a farm in a densely populated area became
infected, where sheds are sometimes within a few hundred metres
from each other, the virus spread via dust or feather debris.
2.2 Statistical Estimation of the Reproductive
Number
Assuming homogeneous mixing, that all farms are equally infec-
tious, and that the time-dependence of infectiousness from the
point of infection is identical, we can estimate both the distribution
of generation time intervals and the reproductive numbers of
individual farms from the time-course of an epidemic using the
following method [19].
Suppose there are N infected farms, labelled i=1,…,N, and
ordered so that the first k farms are those that contracted their
infection from outside sources. The infection times of these farms
are t= (t1,…,tN) such that t1 =…= tk=0. Under the simplest model
that neglects any differences between farms, spatial locations, etc.,
the probability that farm j[fkz1,:::,Ng was infected by farm
i[f1,:::Ng is
p(i,j; h)~
w(tj{ti; h)PN
m~1 w(tj{tm; h)
, ð1Þ
where the generation time distribution has density w(T;h), which is
defined to be 0 if T,0 and indexed by unknown parameter vector
h. Under the above assumptions, the number of farms infected by
farm i (i.e. the reproductive number of farm i) in the outbreak can
be represented as an outcome from a random variable
Ri~
XN
j~kz1
Bij , where Bij*Bernoulli p(i,j; h)ð Þ, ð2Þ
that is, a sum of Bernoulli random variables, which has expected
value
E(Ri)~
XN
j~kz1
p(i,j; h): ð3Þ
Now denote the ‘infection tree’ by v= (vk+1,…,vN), defined such
that vj= i if farm j was infected by farm i. Under (1), the likelihood
for h when v and t are observed is
L(h; v,t)~PNj~kz1w(tj{tvj ; h): ð4Þ
But as v is unobserved we sum over all possible infection trees to
obtain the ‘integrated likelihood’
L(h; t)~PNj~kz1
X
i[Sj
w(tj{ti; h), ð5Þ
where Sj={1,…,N}\{j} is the set of all indices other than j. The
integrated likelihood is a genuine likelihood (up to a multiplicative
constant) permitting valid inferences about h conditional on
outbreak size N.
2.2.1. Maximum Likelihood estimation of the generation
time The maximum likelihood (ML) estimate h^ is obtained by
minimizing twice the negative log-likelihood
{2 lnL(h; t)~{2
XN
j~kz1
ln
X
i[Sj
w(tj{ti; h)
0
@
1
A: ð6Þ
More details on how ML estimation is performed are given in
Appendix S1. We assume the generation times T= tj2ti are
Weibull distributed, with density
w(T ; k,g)~kgkTk{1 exp {(gT)kð Þ, ð7Þ
and so h= (k, g). Minimization was performed using the Downhill
Simplex method [20], the code used for these calculations is given in
Code S1 and Code S2; to ensure the global minimum is reached, the
procedure was run from 10000 different starting points.
We further investigated whether the generation time distribu-
tion changed after control measures were introduced. To do this,
we extended the above model to allow for distinct parameters for
the generation times before and after controls, hpre and hpost, see
Code S3 and Code S4. The improvement in fit compared to the
original model was assessed using a likelihood ratio test.
2.2.2. Estimation of the reproductive number Given h^ we
can estimate the mean and variance of the generation time
distribution. Moreover, we can estimate the reproductive number
for each infected farm via equation (3), and the mean reproduction
number for any subset of infected farms.
To calculate confidence intervals for the reproductive number we
use an approximation of the parametric bootstrap percentile interval
method [21]. To obtain proper parametric bootstrap intervals would
involve generating infection times and trees according to the
underlying epidemic model, which we do not wish to specify
completely. Instead, the following two-step approximation is used,
which we propose will be a good approximation for large N . These
two steps approximate generating realisations from the underlying
epidemic process. First, we take bootstrap samples of parameter
values from the conventional approximation to the sampling
distribution of the ML estimator,
(k,g)*N2 (k^,g^),V (k^,g^)f g, ð8Þ
that is, from a bivariate normal distribution with mean (k^,g^) and
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variance-covariance matrix V based on the inverse of the observed
information matrix (see Appendix S1 for further details, the code
used to generate the bootstrap sample is given in Code S5 and Code
S6).
This first stage can be loosely thought of as sampling the mean
behaviour for a subgroup of possible outbreaks. To allow for
variability within each subgroup, stage two involves fixing
(k*,g*)and independently generating reproductive numbers for
each farm according to model (2). Steps one and two together give
R*={R*i:i21,…,N}, an approximate bootstrap sample of the
reproductive numbers for each farm. Here, 1000 samples of (k,g)-
pairs were drawn, and 500 sets of reproductive numbers generated
for each. Finally, the approximate 95% CI for each Ri is given by
the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the bootstrap distribution. The
second stage of the calculation of the approximate CIs was done
using Code S7 and Code S8.
RESULTS
3.1. Generation time distribution
The generation time is defined as the time between the infection of
a farm and the time at which the farm passes on infection to
another farm. We have assumed the generation time distribution is
Weibull. While this is a biologically plausible choice, we cannot
verify it empirically. As such, we assessed robustness to this choice
using other plausible choices such as the gamma distribution
(results not shown). However, the following results under these
alternatives did not differ substantively from those shown below.
Figure 2 shows the estimated generation time distribution for
the four different outbreaks; the parameter estimates are detailed
in Table 1. The estimates, and hence the distribution, differs
substantially between the outbreaks. It could be hypothesised that
the generation time would shorten after measures were put in
place to isolate the infected farms. However, allowing for different
generation time distributions for the pre- and post-control time
periods did not significantly improve the model fit.
3.2. Estimates of the reproductive number
Figure 3 shows the maximum likelihood estimates and their 95%
confidence intervals of the farm-based reproductive numbers over
the course of the outbreaks. For all four outbreaks the estimates of
the mean reproductive number prior to the controls being
implemented are between 1.1 and 2.4 (Table 2) with upper 95%
bounds in the range 1.5–3.6.
The impact of control measures on the effective reproductive
number can be clearly seen in all four outbreaks. For the outbreak
in Italy (Figure 3a), their introduction rapidly reduced the
reproductive number, hovering around the threshold of 1 for the
next few months before finally dying out. In British Columbia
(Figure 3b) controls were put in place after detection of the first IP.
However our estimates of the reproductive number remain high
until 24th March when the decision was taken to cull the whole
high risk region. Our estimates show that the control activities
following this decision were effective in reducing the reproductive
number to below one.
Our results show that the situation in the Gelderse Vallei, The
Netherlands (Figure 3c) differed in that the initial control measures
failed to bring the reproductive number reliably below 1, and the
epidemic only died out at the end of March after the depletion of
susceptible flocks in the affected area [15]. The same controls were
applied to the Limburg epidemic but our estimates show in this
case the reproductive number was reduced to just below 1
(Figure 3d), and so potentially effective in controlling the outbreak.
However, the end of the epidemic in late April coincided here too
with the depletion of susceptible flocks and therefore it is possible
that the epidemic would have taken substantially longer to control
had there been a larger pool of susceptible flocks in the area.
DISCUSSION
Our estimates of the farm-to-farm reproductive number prior to
interventions for HPAI are in the range 1.1 to 2.4 and were
remarkably consistent across the four datasets. However, these
estimates are substantially lower than those previously reported for
the Dutch epidemic. Prior to the implementation of control
measures we obtained estimates of 1.1 (95% CI 0.9–1.5) in the
Gelderse Vallei and 1.9, (95% CI 1.0–3.0) in Limburg which are
significantly lower than those previously reported for the same
outbreak prior to notification (6.5 (95% CI 3.1–9.9) for the
epidemic in the Gelderse Vallei). However, as demonstrated in
Figure 3c, there was substantial variation in our estimates of
individual reproductive numbers prior to interventions. In
addition, in the previous study, the generation time was not
estimated directly from the data but based on observational and
experimental data on the course of infection in the farms. Our
estimate of the generation time for this region is of the order of
2 days, whereas the values previously assumed for the infectious
period were defined per flock as the time between detection and
culling plus an additional 4 days to cover the time before the
infection was detected but during which birds were infectious. The
previously published estimates therefore assumed a much longer
mean generation time and this could also lead to a higher
estimated reproductive number.
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Figure 2. Maximum likelihood estimates for the generation time
distributions. Parameters of these distributions are shown in Table 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000349.g002
Table 1. Parameters of the generation time distributions.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dataset k g mean variance
Italy 2.2 (1.7–3.0) 0.18 (0.14–0.22) 5.0 (4.0–6.3) 5.9 (3.5–11.7)
British Columbia 1.6 (1.1–2.5) 0.11 (0.07–0.16) 8.4 (5.7–12.1) 29 (12–84)
Gelderse Vallei 2.9 (1.9–4.1) 0.46 (0.29–0.59) 1.9 (1.5–3.1) 0.51 (0.23–2.2)
Limburg 3.3 (1.6–8.3) 0.26 (0.19–0.38) 3.4 (2.3–4.9) 1.3 (0.37–5.1)
Shown are the maximum likelihood estimates (95% confidence intervals) of the
parameters k and g, and of mean and variance of the resulting distributions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000349.t001..
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Our results showed substantial differences between the
estimated generation time distributions for the different outbreaks.
Whilst much is known from experimental studies on the course of
infection in individual birds [11,22–24], estimates of the
generation time at the farm-level are more difficult to obtain.
Although it is perhaps surprising that the generation time differs
between the outbreaks, it is plausible that such differences could
arise because of variation in farming practices or in the contact
patterns between farms. In addition, the latent and infectious
periods determining the generation time may differ by the strain of
HPAI. Alternatively, the estimates may be biased because of
assumptions made in the method. In particular, we assumed that
the datasets were complete (and thus that all infected farms were
detected) and that only the first farm in each outbreak was infected
from an outside source. If, however, further undetected farms had
played a role in transmission, this would substantially alter the
estimates of the generation time and the reproductive number,
particularly if these infections occurred towards the beginning or
end of the epidemics where overall cases are sparser.
All of the outbreaks investigated here occurred within dense
poultry farming areas and hence were difficult to control. The
control policies implemented in the different outbreaks were
similar, comprising strict bio-security measures for movement of
poultry and poultry products, swift culling of infected flocks, and if
these failed to control the epidemics, additional pre-emptive
culling of flocks in the neighbourhood of any infected farms. Our
results demonstrate that the bio-security measures, movement
restrictions and culling of infected farms, all of which were
initiated early on in the outbreaks, did have an effect but for all
four outbreaks only reduced the reproductive number to close to
the threshold value of 1. The additional pre-emptive culling of
flocks and de-population of the areas was needed to fully control
the outbreaks. Current contingency plans for HPAI outbreaks in
Europe focus on the former set of control measures to contain any
outbreak [25]. Whilst differences in farming practices between
countries mean that it is difficult to predict whether these measures
will be sufficient for a new outbreak, our analyses suggest that
additional interventions may well be required. Close monitoring of
outbreaks, coupled with quantitative estimation of the reproduc-
tive number, is therefore needed to ensure that such additional
measures, if required, are promptly implemented.
The method used here to estimate the reproductive number and
generation time parameters is an extension of that developed by
Wallinga and Teunis [19] for the SARS-epidemic. This method
requires only time-series data for an outbreak, and is therefore
easily applied even in real-time. Technically, appropriate censor-
ing terms should be added to the likelihood to account for
infection times yet to occur, but a straightforward application of
the method as described here will give estimates unbiased in an
asymptotic sense. If data on the spatial location of infected farms
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Figure 3. Estimates of the reproductive number over time for the four epidemics. The estimates are obtained with the MLE for the generation time
distribution parameters. The light blue area shows the 95% confidence intervals. The vertical orange line marks the date of reinforced controls. For
British Columbia, this was the date the decision to cull the HRR region was taken, for the other datasets it is the date of detection of HPAI within the
area.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000349.g003
Table 2. Maximum and mean reproductive numbers for each
outbreak.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dataset Maximum R mean R pre-intervention
Italy 2.3 1.9 (1.2–2.7)
British Columbia 3.2 2.4 (1.4–3.6)
Gelderse Vallei 2.9 1.1 (0.9–1.5)
Limburg 2.2 1.9 (1.0–3.0)
Maximum reproductive numbers estimated for any farm during the course of
each outbreak and mean reproductive numbers R (95% confidence intervals)
prior to enforced interventions for the four different datasets. The mean
reproductive numbers prior to intervention were calculated using Code S9 and
Code S10.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000349.t002..
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are also available, this information can easily be incorporated to
estimate the spatial transmission kernel and improve the
estimation of the reproductive numbers. Such an approach was
successfully applied to the Foot-and-Mouth epidemic in the UK in
2001 [26]. Further work is required to explicitly incorporate
missing data, as this is likely to have a strong influence on the
estimates of both the generation time and the reproductive
number. Such methods are of particular importance to estimating
the reproductive number for outbreaks of HPAI in Asia in which,
with high general levels of poultry mortality, cases are likely to be
less well documented.
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